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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The issues of practical construction and latent ambiguity 
continually were raised with the trial court by Defendant Franz C. 
Stangl, III and the other Defendants ("Stangl") and are reflected 
in the testimony proffered by Stangl. These issues permeated the 
case and are central to the decision at hand. Although Stangl did 
not specifically refer to the doctrines of practical construction 
or latent ambiguity by their formal names, the lack of a specific 
reference to the formal name does not preclude Stangl from citing 
to those doctrines on appeal. General reference to the legal 
principles underlying a legal doctrine sufficiently preserves the 
relevant issues. Appellate courts uniformly adhere to this principle. 
Parol evidence is allowed to explain the meaning of documents 
when both parties to a contract demonstrate a different 
interpretation and understanding by their actions. The doctrine of 
practical construction is an exception to the parol evidence rule. 
Once the parties demonstrate by their actions that to them the 
contract has a particular meaning, the intent of the parties will 
be enforced and parol evidence is admitted. In order to enforce 
the intent of the parties, it is necessary for the court to hear 
all extrinsic evidence. 
Stangl is neither estopped from asserting the ultra vires 
defense nor did the legislature ratify the transaction. The 
principles of waiver and estoppel cannot be applied to circumvent 
stated legislative intent and policy. A contract which violates a 
statute is void ab initio and cannot be ratified or approved in any 
manner so as to create an enforceable liability. 
In addition, the amendment of the statute did not act so as to 
ratify the transaction. The amendment to the statute affected the 
substantive rights of the parties and specifically enlarged the 
rights and duties of Plaintiff Utah State Retirement Board, as 
trustee of the Utah State Retirement Fund, ('"Fund" ) by allowing it 
to invest in a broader range of mortgages. The statutory amendment 
did much more than merely affect the legal machinery by which the 
Fund's rights and duties are determined. Accordingly, the statute 
cannot be applied retroactively. 
The Fund has failed in any meaningful way to defend against 
Stanglf s argument that the trial court improperly awarded compound 
interest. Compound interest is not allowed unless the parties 
expressly agree to it because of its extremely onerous effect. The 
Fund has failed to demonstrate that the parties expressly agreed to 
compound interest and, accordingly, the award of compound interest 
is clearly improper. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE ISSUES ON APPEAL WERE SUFFICIENTLY 
RAISED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT 
The Fund asserts that Stangl failed to argue to the trial 
court the doctrine of practical construction and that the 
transaction documents contain a latent ambiguity* The Fund has 
ignored or overlooked numerous references to these doctrines in the 
record below and attempts to raise a procedural scapegoat to avoid 
facing the merits of these issues. The issues of practical 
construction and latent ambiguity continually were raised before 
the trial court, and are reflected by the testimony proffered by 
Stangl. These issues permeated the trial and are central to the 
decision at hand. 
In James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), this 
court held that fl[a] matter is sufficiently raised if it has been 
submitted to the trial court and the trial court has had the 
opportunity to make findings of fact or law." Id. at 801. In the 
present case, Stangl persistently raised the issues of practical 
construction and latent ambiguity with the trial court. Judge 
Bunnell ruled on these issues by not allowing the introduction of 
any parol evidence and by rejecting Stanglfs arguments that this 
evidence should have been admitted. Accordingly, Stangl 
sufficiently raised the issues of practical construction and latent 
ambiguity because the Court had the opportunity to rule on these 
issues. Moreover, it is irrelevant that Stangl did not 
specifically refer to these doctrines by their formal names. 
The lack of a specific reference to the formal name of the 
doctrine does not preclude Stangl from citing to that doctrine on 
appeal. General reference to the legal principle(s) underlying the 
doctrine sufficiently preserves the relevant issues. Appellate 
courts uniformly adhere to this principle. In Danes v. Automobile 
Underwriters, Inc. 307 N.E.2d 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974), the Indiana 
Court of Appeals was faced with a similar situation, although 
involving a statute. In Danes, the plaintiff, who was acting as 
guardian for her minor child, sought a declaration that a previous 
release of her daughter's claims against an uninsured motorist 
pursuant to a settlement entered into by the plaintiff be declared 
void. Although the plaintiff argued the release was "'void ab 
initio' as against public policy," the plaintiff failed to cite to 
an Indiana statute which specifically required that a compromise or 
settlement of a minor's claim is valid only when approved by the 
court. Id. at 903. The plaintiff first made specific reference to 
the statute itself in the plaintiff's appellate brief. Although 
the defendant insurer asserted that the citation of the statute 
gave rise to a new issue on appeal which was not before the trial 
court, the appellate court disagreed stating that the plaintiff 
persistently argued that a minor's claim may 
not be compromised or settled without court 
approval . . . . Questions within the issues 
and before the trial court are before the 
appellee (sic) court, and new arguments and 
authorities may with strict priority be 
brought forward. 
Id. at 905 (emphasis added). 
A 
In Wojt v. Chimacum School Dist. No. 49, 516 P.2d 1099 (Wash, 
Ct. App. 1973), the Washington court similarly held that a failure 
specifically to cite to a statute did not preclude the appellant 
from bringing the statute to the court' s attention during the 
appeal. Id. at 1103 n.4. In Wojt, the plaintiff challenged the 
legal sufficiency of the stated causes for his discharge from one 
of the defendant's schools, but failed to cite to the court a 
statute which required the promulgation of evaluative guidelines 
concerning teaching and other classroom-related performance. In 
holding that the plaintiff could cite to the court the statute for 
the first time on appeal, the court stated that the primary issue 
before the trial court was the legal sufficiency of the stated 
causes for discharge and, accordingly "[a]11 statutes and 
authorities which bear upon the issue of the sufficiency of the 
causes are therefore properly before this court." Id. (emphasis in 
original). 
Other courts have also held that the failure to specifically 
cite to a statute at trial did not preclude its citation during 
appeal. See, e.g., Independent Nat'l Bank v. Westmoor Elec. Inc., 
795 P.2d 210 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (where defendant failed to cite 
to Arizona statute providing for set-off, the court found that 
defendant's general argument concerning set-off sufficiently 
preserved argument for appeal); Hartwell Corp. v. Smith, 686 P.2d 
79 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984) (general reference to statute of 
limitations, but failure to specifically cite statute, did not 
preclude its use during appeal). 
In the present case, although Stangl did not specifically cite 
to the doctrine of practical construction, Stangl did persistently 
argue that theory to the trial court. Counsel for Stangl asserted 
that the conduct of the parties created an ambiguity in the 
partnership agreement and transaction documents that did not exist 
on the face of the documents, and that parol evidence, thus, should 
be received. During the trial, Stangl proffered testimony from 
both himself and Butch Johnson that the parties had treated the 
transaction as an equity transaction and not a loan transaction. 
As more fully set forth in Appellant's prior brief, Mr. Johnson 
testified as follows: 
Q: Subsequently to that point, Mr. Johnson, 
if you know, how did the State Retirement 
Fund carry the Creekview Property on 
their books? Was it treated as a loan or 
equity or both or do you know? 
A: It was treated as an equity. 
(Trial Transcript of January 30, 1991 (emphasis added)). 
Counsel for Stangl further questioned William Chipman, Mr. 
Johnson's successor at the Fund, about the Fund's characterization 
of the transaction between the parties. The court sustained an 
objection to the question, stating: 
Objection sustained. I do that on the ground 
what his category or even the Fund's category 
of treatment as far as their internal 
operation is concerned does not change the 
legal obligations on the parties as reflected 
by the documents they executed. 
(Trial Transcript of January 30, 1991 at 236-37 (emphasis added)). 
Because Stangl continually attempted to introduce evidence on 
the issue of the parties' treatment and conduct with respect to the 
transaction, and asserted that this evidence created an ambiguity 
thus allowing parol evidence, Stangl has sufficiently preserved the 
issue of the doctrine of practical construction for this appeal, 
regardless of whether Stangl specifically cited to the trial court 
the formal name of the doctrine. 
In addition, the issue of latent ambiguity was sufficiently 
raised at trial. As Stangl testified at trial, it simply did not 
make sense that he would contribute $500,000 to a partnership for 
a 20% interest and assume personal responsibility for a $4.35 
million dollar loan, while at the same time, the Fund contributed 
$100.00 for an 80% interest in the partnership and assumed no risk 
with respect to the loan. Such a construction of the agreements 
would produce an absurd result. As testified to by Stangl during 
his proffer: 
I was not willing to pay for 100% of the debt 
of an empty shopping center to a partner, 
whofs the lender, and get back nothing but 
paid receipts, and in the end have to give 
them 80 percent ownership in the property that 
I had to pay for. It was never part of the 
bargain; it was never negotiated. It never 
entered my mind in any way that that was going 
to be required to do so. 
(Trial Transcript of January 30, 1991 at 77.) 
Accordingly, because Stangl argued that the conduct of the 
parties created an ambiguity and that the effect of these 
documents, as now read by the Fund, would produce an absurd result, 
the issue of latent ambiguity was preserved for appeal. 
II. 
THE DOCTRINE OF PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION IS AN 
EXCEPTION TO THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 
As set forth in Stanglfs prior brief, parol evidence is 
allowed to explain the meaning of documents when both parties to 
the contract demonstrate a different meaning by their actions. 
See, e.g., Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266 (Utah 
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1972); Bullough v. Sims, 400 P.2d 20 (Utah 1965); EIE v. St. 
Benedicts Hosp., 638 P. 2d 1190 (Utah 1981). The Fund, however, 
asserts that the doctrine of practical construction does not allow 
parol evidence and that these rules are "mutually exclusive." 
Brief of Appellee, p. 12. As stated by the Fund, "[e]ven if a 
court were to apply the doctrine of practical construction, the 
parol evidence rule would still exclude extrinsic evidence of 
contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements of 
what the parties intended, thought, believed or understood 
concerning the interpretation or the purpose of the writings. 
Courts applying the doctrine of practical construction may only 
consider the parties1 post-execution actions and performance." 
Brief of Appellee, p. 13 (emphasis in original). The Fund appears 
to have twisted the doctrine of practical construction so as to 
completely nullify its effect and has offered no support for this 
assertion. 
The doctrine of practical construction is an exception to the 
parol evidence rule, and once the court applies the doctrine, parol 
evidence is received. That is the express purpose of the doctrine. 
As set forth in EIE v. St. Benedicts Hosp., 638 P.2d 1190 (Utah 
1981), once the parties demonstrate by their actions that to them, 
the contract has a particular meaning, "the intent of the parties 
will be enforced." Id. at 1195 (emphasis added) (citing Bullfrog 
Marina v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266, 271 (Utah 1972); Bullough v. Sims, 
400 P.2d 20, 23 (Utah 1965)). In order to enforce the "intent" of 
the parties, it is necessary for the court to hear all relevant 
extrinsic evidence. 
Moreover, the doctrine of practical construction will not 
bring the commercial world to its knees as the Fund seems to 
suggest. Inherent within the doctrine of practical construction is 
a requirement that the party asserting the doctrine show through 
conduct and actions that to the parties involved the contract meant 
something different. Accordingly, there is the built-in safeguard 
of the applicable burden of proof. 
As the Fund suggests, parties must be assured their contracts 
will be enforced by the courts, but their enforcement should be in 
the same manner the parties have conducted themselves and not in 
accordance with a contrived reading of the agreement. One party to 
a contract should not be permitted to hide behind a newly feigned 
contractual interpretation when that party knows very well, and has 
acted as if, the provision means something quite different. This 
is the precise purpose for the doctrine of practical construction. 
In the present case, Stangl attempted to introduce evidence 
regarding the conduct and intent of the parties, but was precluded 
from doing so by the trial court. Although the Fund strenuously 
objected at trial to the introduction of any of this evidence, the 
Fund now appears to be arguing their case and proffering evidence 
in their brief that was neither offered nor received at trial, 
which supposedly supports their position that the conduct of the 
parties would not require a different reading of the agreement. 
The Fund also asserts that Stanglf s briefs demonstrate an 
uncertainty regarding the purpose of the transaction and that there 
is an inconsistency in the briefs. There is no inconsistency in 
Stanglfs briefs. The briefs, however, point to and emphasize 
different reasons why the transaction was structured in the manner 
it was. The transaction was evidenced by loan agreements to enable 
the Fund to acquire an ownership interest in an income-producing 
property and to provide Stangl with certain tax benefits. 
As Stangl testified, the "loan" documents were used merely as 
a "scorekeeping method" for the Fund. Stangl had no objection to 
structuring the transaction in this manner because it provided him 
with certain tax benefits. Although these tax benefits were of 
value to him, they did not offset, as the Fund suggests, any 
disproportionate allocation of interest and risk. Under the Fund's 
scenario, Stangl contributed to the partnership property worth 
$500,000 and received a 20% interest, while at the same time the 
Fund contributed only $100 and a promise to make a loan and 
received an 80% interest. Under this scenario, Stangl also assumed 
sole liability for the loan. Whatever the tax benefits may have 
been from structuring the transaction as a loan, they do not offset 
instantly giving away $400,000 of value and assuming sole liability 
for a $4.35 million loan. 
In addition, the Fund asserts that Stangl's briefs leave many 
questions unanswered, such as what conduct of the Fund after the 
closing is inconsistent with the documents; where is the ambiguity; 
what is the relevance of the Fund's 80% ownership in the 
Partnership; why does Stangl believe that the notes and guarantees 
are unenforceable; and why does Stangl believe that the notes do 
not need to be repaid simply because the Fund owned 80% of the 
partnership. Brief of Appellees, p. 22. These questions, however, 
have been answered. 
After signing the agreements, the Fund continued to book the 
transaction and the Fund's investment as equity. The Fund also 
made this representation to its auditors. In addition, Mr. 
Johnson, who was a former employee of the Fund and responsible for 
this agreement, testified that the Fund treated its investment as 
an equity investment. The Fund also excused Stangl from making the 
"payments" for a seven month period, with no penalty or adverse 
action taken against him. The ambiguity arises because of the 
parties1 treatment of the transaction as an equity investment, 
while the documents on their face treat the transaction as a loan. 
The Fund's 80% ownership in the Partnership further supports 
Stanglf s position that the Fund had made an equity investment. 
Otherwise, the Fund would instantly receive an 80% interest in 
property worth $500,000 for only making a loan. Finally, the notes 
are unenforceable and do not need to be repaid because of the 
doctrine of practical construction. The parties, by their actions 
and conduct, have shown that to them the contract meant something 
completely different. 
An appellate brief, however, is neither the place nor the 
vehicle to introduce new evidence or to make factual arguments. 
The proper place is an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, this 
Court should remand this case to the trial court to hear all of the 
evidence relative to the conduct of the parties so that the meaning 
and intent of the parties may be established. 
III. 
THE LOAN AGREEMENT CONSTITUTED AN ULTRA VIRES ACT 
BECAUSE IT WAS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE FUND'S AUTHORITY 
The Fund's supposed defenses to the ultra vires issue, that 
Stangl is estopped from asserting the ultra vires defense and the 
that the legislature ratified the "loan" transaction, are shams and 
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are unsupported by the case law. The Fund cites Town of Gila Bend 
v. Walled Lake Door Co., 490 P.2d 551 (Ariz. 1971), in support of 
its estoppel argument. The Fund quotes from this case that "' [i]t 
would be grossly unfair to all concerned to allow the Town to idly 
sit back and reap the benefits of its bargain without requiring it 
to pay accordingly.f" Brief of Appellees, pp. 35-36 (quoting Town 
of Gila Bend, 490 P. 2d at 558). However, the Fund has grossly 
taken this quote out of context and has misstated the holding of 
the case. Immediately following the Fund's quote, the court in 
Gila Bend stated: 
Relative to the contention that estoppel and 
waiver cannot be used to prevent the Town from 
asserting the illegality of a contract, we 
agree. In the instant case, however, the 
agreement was not illegal. 
In a proper case, the principles of waiver 
and estoppel cannot be applied to circumvent 
stated legislative intent and policy, nor can 
a contract which violates A.R.S. § 42-303, 
subsec. D and is, therefore, void ab initio be 
ratified or approved in any manner by 
defendant or its officers or any other person 
so as to create an enforceable liability. 
Id. at 558 (emphasis added). 
The Fund's ratification argument similarly has no merit. The 
Fund cites Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Assoc, 795 P.2d 
665 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), for the proposition that "fa statute may 
be applied retroactively if it affects only procedural and not 
substantive rights.1" Brief of Appellee, p. 37 (quoting Washington 
Nat11, 795 P. 2d at 667). The Fund, however, provides no argument 
or authority as to whether the statutory amendment in this case is 
procedural or substantive. As set forth in Washington Nat'l, 
"[s]ubstantive law is defined as the positive 
law which creates, defines and regulates the 
rights and duties of the parties and which may 
give rise to a cause of action, as 
distinguished from adjective law which 
pertains to and prescribes the practice and 
procedure or the legal machinery by which the 
substantive law is determined or made 
effective." 
795 P.2d at 669 (quoting Petty v. Clark, 192 P.2d 589, 593-94 (Utah 
1948)). The Washington Nat'1 court further stated that "[i]f a 
statutory amendment changes the contractual rights and obligations 
of the parties, it is substantive." Id. at 669. 
In the present case, the statute created, defined and 
regulated the rights and duties of the Fund by setting forth the 
investments which it could make. The amendment in this case 
specifically enlarged the rights and duties of the Fund by allowing 
it to invest in a broader range of mortgages. The statutory 
amendment does much more than merely affect the legal machinery by 
which the Fund's rights and duties are determined. The statutory 
amendment is substantive and not procedural, and therefore, the 
statute cannot be applied retroactively. 
As set forth in Stanglfs prior brief, a court should make 
every aittempt to interpret a document in order to give it legal 
effect. Stangl v. Todd, 554 P.2d 1316, 1319-20 (Utah 1976). In 
order to give legal effect to the subject documents in this case, 
the Court must construe them in accordance with the intentions and 
conduct of the parties, which was an equity investment. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING COMPOUND INTEREST 
The Fund has failed in any meaningful way to oppose Stanglf s 
argument that the trial court improperly awarded compound interest. 
Instead, the Fund states that the compound interest issue was 
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addressed in the prior briefs in the first appeal and that "there 
exists no reason to rehash that issue again." Brief of Appellee, 
p. 38. The simple fact is that compound interest is not allowed 
unless the parties expressly agree to compound interest. See 
Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 776 P.2d 643, 647 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). The reason for this requirement is the extremely 
onerous effect compound interest can have. As an example, the 
difference in interest between simple and compound interest in this 
case would be in excess of $300,000.00. The Fund has failed to 
distinguish the Mountain States case or to show how the parties 
expressly agreed to compound interest in the present case. 
Accordingly, the award of compound interest is improper and the 
case must be remanded for a determination of the proper amount of 
interest calculated on a simple interest basis. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the arguments contained in this Brief, Stanglfs 
initial brief filed on October 28, 1992 and the Brief of Appellant 
and Reply Brief of Appellant filed March 28, 1991 and June 17, 
1991, respectively, defendants respectfully request this Court to 
reverse and remand with the following instructions to the trial 
court: (1) to receive and consider evidence of the parties' intent 
in entering the partnership agreement and loan document; (2) to 
apply the law concerning the legality of the loans; (3) to change 
the interest on any judgment entered to simple interest; (4) to 
order the entry of a satisfaction of the summary judgment so that 
there are no duplicate judgments against Stangl; and (5) to order 
1 A 
Respectfully submitted this 
Judge Bunnell to recuse himself from further trial or pre-trial 
proceedings in the case. 
is C^Vl^ day of August, 1993. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
-GLARK W. -5E" ~ 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN 
ROBERT E. MANSFIELD 
On this 3?i 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
day of August 1993, I hereby caused to be 
hand-delivered, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply 
Brief of Appellants to the following: 
R. Stephen Marshall, Esq. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
-' /' 
./ / //T, 
